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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of government spending on private consumption and investment 
in the European Union. A certain consensus has been reached on the expansionary Keynesian 
effects on the economic activity of fiscal impulses. However, the existing empirical literature has 
concentrated on few countries, mostly outside the EU. We check the validity of this result for the 
EU area, by using annual data and a panel vector auto-regression approach (PVAR), with 
particular attention being paid to robustness across alternative identification assumptions (based on 
Cholesky orderings). Our results show that shocks in public spending positively affect private 
consumption and investment. According to our baseline estimate, a 1% increase in public spending 
produces a 0.24%  impact rise in private consumption, and a 0.41% impact rise in private 
investment. The effects are substantial, and die out slowly in the case of private consumption (the 
cumulative impact amounts to 0.56% after 3 years), but much faster in the case of private 
investment. A further disaggregation between wage and non-wage components reveals that  public 
salaries have a relatively stronger stimulating role. Note that this is not due to the different weights 
on GDP of the two components, which have comparable values in our sample. 
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1. Introduction 
How does government spending affect private consumption in the EU area? The relationship between 
these two variables.has been widely explored in both theoretical and empirical macroeconomic 
literature. Theoretically, two main alternative views can be distinguished: the Real Business Cycle 
(RBC) and the Keynesian approaches. In standard RBC models (see, e.g., Baxter and King, 1993), an 
increase in government consumption increases the net present value of taxation, because Ricardian 
equivalence holds among intertemporally optimizing consumers. This, in turn, reduces permanent 
income, and the associated negative wealth effect causes both a decrease in private consumption and an 
increase in labour supply.1 As a result, a positive government spending shock reduces private 
consumption and increases output. On the other hand, Keynesian approaches rescue a positive 
relationship between government and private consumption, basically by including additional effects on 
the above chain of events. The combined effects of credit-constrained agents (who are not able to 
smooth consumption over time and are therefore forced to consume out of their current real wage) and 
nominal price rigidities (which permit an outward shift of the labour demand curve following the 
increase in aggregate demand) can cause an increase in real wage and thus an increase in aggregate 
consumption, as long as the share of credit-constrained agents is quantitatively relevant (Gali et al., 
2007).2 Recently, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) employed preferences à la Greenwood et al. (1988) so 
to reduce the size of the outward shift of the labour supply curve following the negative wealth effect.3 
Thus, they obtain the increase in the real wage which leads to an increase in aggregate consumption 
through the standard substitution effect, with no need of assuming credit-constrained agents.4 
A large econometric literature has developed in order to verify the empirical relevance of the two 
competing theoretical approaches. While most of the studies are VAR-based analysis exclusively based 
on US economy (Fatas and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Gali and Perotti, 2003; Ramey, 
2007; Monacelli and Perotti, 2008), very few focus on selected European countries (Monacelli and 
Perotti, 2006; Perotti, 2004; Biau and Girard, 2005; Perotti, 2007). Moreover, the object of the analysis 
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 This effect assumes that consumption and leisure are normal goods. 
2
 In general equilibrium models, the real wage increase occurs if the monetary policy response to output is not strong 
enough to reduce the increase in labour demand. 
3
 See also Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). Other attempts include the consideration of a 
negative reaction of the mark-up in monopolistic competitive frameworks (Ravn et al., 2006), or an ad-hoc complementarity 
between labour supply and aggregate consumption in the utility function (Linneman, 2006).  
4
 Bouakez and Rebei (2007) insert non-sperability between government expenditure and private consumption in the utility 
function, so to obtain a positive comovement within an otherwise standard frictionless RBC framework. 
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is often the relationship between public spending and GDP, not private consumption. In a nutshell, a 
large part of the evidence points towards a positive effect of government expenditure on private 
consumption, although results vary considerably across different estimation techniques and 
identification strategies (see Perotti, 2007 for a detailed survey). However, none of the above 
contributions is specifically targeted at the European economy as a whole. Indeed, they either 
concentrate on one or two EU countries - namely the UK and West Germany - as a part of a wider 
analysis that includes also USA and Canada, or they are country-specific studies (Biau and Girard, 
2007 on France; Giordano et al,. 2008 on Italy).  Three notable exceptions are contributions by 
Beetsma et al. (2006),  by Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004), and by Burriel et al. (2010), all based on EU 
countries. However, they all differ substantially from our present contribution. In particular, Beetsma et 
al. (2006) use a parsimonious three-variables PVAR (public spending, net taxes and GDP) as the focus 
of their analysis is different from the links between public spending and private consumption. On the 
other hand, in Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) the approach is totally different from the other VAR-based 
studies cited above, as they perform a GMM estimation of an Euler equation assuming non-separability 
between private and public consumption in the utility function.5 Finally, Burriel et al. (2010) estimate a 
structural VAR using a new quarterly EU dataset, following the strategy of Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) in order to facilitate the comparison. Although, they mainly look at the effects of fiscal policy 
on GDP, among the additional results, they also present the estimates of some parsimonious VARs that 
include either private consumption or investment, with qualitative results roughly in line with ours. 
In this paper we perform a detailed PVAR analysis on 14 EU countries, using annual data from 1970 to 
2006. Firstly, we estimate a 6-variables PVAR capable to grasp the effects of fiscal policy on private 
consumption and investment. Then, we disaggregate public expenditure between wage and non-wage 
components to investigate the main responsible for the estimated transmission mechanisms. We back 
up these analysis with extensive robustness checks concerning not only the identification scheme, but 
also the panel dimension of the sample. The novelty of our contribution is based on two dimensions: 
the estimation methodology and the sample under investigation. About the former, we adopt a PVAR 
approach, which is becoming increasingly widespread in macroeconomic analysis (Beetsma et al. 2006, 
2008, Almunia et al. 2010). The use of a PVAR allows us to take advantage of the resulting large 
sample dimension, which, given the non-parsimonious nature of our model and the data frequency 
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 Nevertheless, Fiorito and Kollinztas (2004) achieve interesting results in terms of disaggregation of public expenditure; 
they find that while public goods substitute for private consumption, public expenditure on merit goods seems to 
complement for it.  
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(annual), strengthens the validity of our results. However, this occurs at the cost of assuming 
homogenous slope parameters, although we explicitly account for the necessary country-specific 
heterogeneity by allowing for country fixed effects. About the latter, while the empirical literature is 
mostly US-based, we specifically focus on the European Union area. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. Increases in government expenditure positively affect both 
private consumption and private investment. According to our baseline estimate, a 1% increase in 
public spending produces a 0.24% on impact rise in private consumption, and a 0.41% impact rise in 
private investment. The effects are substantial, and die out slowly in the case of private consumption 
(0.56% cumulative impact after 3 years), but much faster in the case of private investment. A crucial 
validation of our results lies in their full robustness to a wide range of alternative identification 
schemes, VAR dimensions, sample and time variations. In particular, given the well known sensitivity 
of Structural VAR analysis to changes in the identification assumptions (in our case, the Cholesky 
ordering), we believe it to be a strong support of our estimation results.  
Several additional results come out of the analysis. The disaggregation between wage and non-wage 
components of public expenditure reveals that  public salaries have a relatively stronger stimulating 
role. Note that this is not due to the different weight on GDP of the two components, which have 
comparable values in our sample. Finally, public investment seems to have no stimulating effects 
neither on private consumption nor investment.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical model and the 
dataset. We also extensively detail and discuss our identification strategy to identify exogenous 
spending shocks. In section 3 we present the results of the baseline estimations, focusing on the 
responses to shocks in government consumption. Moreover, we concentrate on the robustness of the 
preferred Cholesky ordering by performing a series of alternative estimations based on different 
identification assumptions. Section 4 presents additional robustness checks, mainly along three 
dimensions: different sets of variables, and different sub-samples and time spans. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical model, data, and estimation strategy 
In this section we present our empirical model based on a six-variables PVAR and the data used in the 
analysis. Most importantly, we outline and discuss our identification strategy, whose robustness will be 
tested straight away in section 3. 
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2.1. Model and data 
Our approach is based on a PVAR with annual data. There are two reasons behind the adoption of this 
particular strategy. First, the PVAR technique combines the traditional VAR approach with panel data, 
which allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity. While the advantage of using panels consists in 
an increase in the number of observations, the disadvantage is the need to impose certain homogeneity 
restrictions. However, by focusing on EU countries only, we limit the potential heterogeneity, as the 
EU economies share many similarities and are part of a substantially integrated economic area. 
Moreover, we check the validity of this neglected heterogeneity by performing several robustness 
checks based on the variation of the countries in the sample (see subsection 4.2). Second, we use 
annual rather than quarterly data, unlike a substantial part of the previous empirical literature. While 
this is a choice induced by the lack of non-interpolated quarterly data, on the other hand the annual 
frequency presents some advantages. For instance, since there is no quarterly calendar for fiscal policy 
revisions, the interpretation of fiscal shocks may be facilitated. Also, potential anticipation effects of 
fiscal policy changes play a smaller role with annual data, as identified shocks are more likely to be 
truly unanticipated (as argued by Beetsma et al. 2008, following Ramey, 2007).  
Our sample consists of 14 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK) over the period 1970-2006.6  Data 
are mainly from the OECD Economic Outlook no.84, although we integrated this source with the Main 
Economic Indicators (published by the European Commission) and the World Development Indicators 
(published by the World Bank). 
The structural form of our PVAR model is given by: 
0 1( )it it itA Z A L Z e−= + ,    (1) 
where Zit is an (mx1) vector of endogenous variables; A0 is an (mxn) matrix with 1’s on the diagonal 
and contains the parameters that capture the contemporaneous relations among the variables; A(L) is a 
matrix polynomial in the lag operator L; finally, eit is the structural disturbance vector. Pre-multiplying 
(1) by 10A− , we obtain the reduced form that we can actually estimate: 
1( )it it itZ B L Z u−= + ,      (2) 
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 The panel  is balanced, apart from very few missing values (Denmark 1970, all series; France 1970-1976, public debt; 
Portugal 1970-1976, all series). Data from West Germany and Germany are combined by splicing growth rates in 1991. We 
excluded Luxembourg due to limited availability of fiscal variables. 
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where 10( ) ( )B L A A L−=   and 10it itu A e−=  is the reduced form residual vector. 
 
2.2. The identification strategy 
In the baseline specification, the vector Z is as follows:  
( , , , , , )it it it it it it itZ GC T P I C B= ,   (3) 
where GCit is government expenditure (wage plus non wage components), Tit is cyclically-adjusted net 
taxes (cyclically adjusted direct plus indirect taxes minus cyclically adjusted net social security 
contributions), Iit is private investment, Cit is private consumption, Pit is price level (Consumer Price 
Index, CPI),  Bit is government gross financial liabilities. All variables (but pricces, which are just 
expressed as the natural logarithm of the CPI) are per capita real values, deflated by their own deflator 
and in natural logarithms.7 The estimation is carried out using the first differences of these variables. 
Our identification scheme is based on a lower triangular Cholesky decomposition with the above 
indicated ordering. Hence, a variable coming earlier in the ordering affects the next ones both 
contemporaneously and with a lag, while a variable coming later has merely lagged effects on the 
preceding ones. The main drawback of using annual data is that specific identifying assumptions might 
be rather strong. We justify them on the base of both theoretical and empirical previous models. Also, 
we explore several alternative Cholesky orderings in subsection 3.3. In our preferred set of 
assumptions, with the ordering of equation (3), we allow government debt to be contemporaneously 
affected by all variables: prices, government consumption and tax revenue as it comes straightforward 
from the government flow budget constraint, plus private demand variables. Notwithstanding the 
annual data frequency, we order nominal prices before aggregate demand components, as 
macroeconomic models calibrated on the Euro area estimate the average frequency of price adjustment 
above four quarters (Gali et al., 2001; Smets and Wouters, 2005). Tax revenue affects private sector 
variables, but it is not affected by them within the period, as we use cyclically-adjusted net taxes, as in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Thus, short-term  business cycle fluctuations do not contemporaneously 
affect the measure of net taxes that we employ. Government expenditure is ordered first, as spending 
plans are usually determined before the new fiscal year starts. This neglects the simultaneous pro-
cyclicality of government spending (Lane, 2003). Nevertheless, government spending can be affected 
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 In all the estimates that follow, we have also tried the same specification using the GDP deflator for all variables, instead 
of their own deflators. Results do not change. 
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by last period levels of private consumption and investment, as well as of all the other variables of the 
system (we use one lag in our preferred specification, although we perform an estimation with two lags 
among the robustness checks in Section 4). Furthermore, we relax this assumption in one of the 
robustness checks based on alternative orderings, finding that the positive effects of government 
expenditure on private consumption are only relatively affected, while they are greatly reduced for 
what concerns private investment.  
Since some of these assumptions may seem too strong at first glance, in subsection 3.3. we extensively 
check their validity by estimating the PVAR with alternative orderings of the variables, finding that our 
main results hold under a wide variety of identification schemes. The use of a PVAR approach requires 
the underlying structure to be the same for each cross-sectional unit. This is likely to be violated in 
practice, even if focusing on the EU ensures a certain degree of similarity among the countries of the 
sample. Nevertheless, we allow for individual heterogeneity by adding country fixed effects. Since they 
are correlated with the regressors due to the lags of the variables, the mean-differencing procedure 
commonly used to eliminate fixed effects will create biased coefficients. To overcome this problem, we 
use forward-mean differencing (Helmert procedure, see Arellano and Bover, 1995). This procedure 
preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors, thus we use the latter 
as instruments and estimate the coefficients by system GMM (Love and Zicchino 2006, Holtz-Eakin et 
al 1988).8  
Next section illustrates the results of our analysis. We focus on the impulse-response functions, which 
describe the reaction of one variable in the system to the innovations of another variable while holding 
all other shocks at zero (that is, we use orthogonalized shocks). 
 
3. Estimation results 
The results are presented in three different subsections. First, we present the preferred specification 
results concerning the impact of government expenditure (specified as both public consumption and 
investment) on private sector variables. Then, we deepen the analysis by disaggregating public 
spending between wage and non wage expenditure. Finally, we investigate the sensitivity of the results 
to alternative Cholesky orderings. Throughout the discussion, we concentrate on the responses of all 
the variables to government expenditure shocks, and especially on the effects on private consumption 
and investment. 
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 To perform the analysis we used the Stata Pvar routine written by Inessa Love (see Love and Zicchino, 2006). 
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3.1. Total government expenditure  
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses for a 1% increase in government spending (see Table 1 for 
details).  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Public spending has a positive impact both on private consumption and private investment, in line with 
the existing empirical results for different economic areas. On impact, the former increases by 0.24% 
and the latter by 0.41%. The effects are substantial, and are very persistent in the case of private 
consumption (positive and statistically significant effects last until the third year from the shock, for a 
cumulated response of 0.56%), but rapidly decline in the case of private investment where the sole 
contemporaneous effect is statistically different from zero.  
We also investigate the role of government investment, by estimating the model in equation (3) where 
we replace government consumption with public investment. Figure 2 (details in Table 2) shows the 
impulse responses for a 1% increase in public investment.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Not surprisingly, given the modest share of government investment on GDP (the average in the sample 
is 3.2%), the responses are quantitatively much less important. Particularly, there is weak evidence of 
crowding-out effects, as private investment reacts negatively on impact with a very low elasticity of -
0.04%. As for the effects on private consumption, there is a negligible (though statistically different 
from zero) positive elasticity only on impact (+0.01%). 
 
3.2. Does the distinction between wage and non-wage expenditure matter? 
The above results reveal the existence of positive effects of government expenditure on private 
consumption and investment. In this subsection we disaggregate the former in order to draw further 
insights on its transmission mechanisms to the economy, estimating two alternative models closely 
related to the one of the baseline. In the first, we replace total public spending with the government 
wage bill (GWit). In the second we replace it with government non-wage expenditure (GNWit). 
Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse responses for an increase in, respectively, government wage and 
government non wage expenditure (details are to be found in Tables 3 and 4).  
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Insert Figures 3 & 4 about here 
 
The responses of private consumption are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent to the baseline 
case. However, shocks in wage and non-wage components of public expenditure impact differently on 
the variables of the system. In particular, the first exerts quantitatively larger and more persistent 
effects than the second on all the variables of the system. Two years after the shock, the effects of 
government wage on private consumption are approximately three times bigger than non-wage 
expenditure (the cumulative impact is 0.46% for the former and 0.16% for the latter).9 Private 
investment reacts in a similar way. It is considerably and positively stimulated on impact by 
government wages shocks (+0.59%), and rather weakly by the residual component of government 
purchases of goods and services (+0.06% on impact). Note that this result is not due to the relative 
weights of the two components, which are comparable in the sample (government wage spending 
averages 12.00% of GDP, while non-wage expenditure is 11.77%. of GDP on average).  
This greater importance of the wage component of public expenditure is consistent with the results of 
Fatàs and Mihov (2001) for the US economy. As a robustness check, they separately include in their 
model wages, non wage expenditure and public investment, finding that the former is the main 
responsible for the estimated rise in private consumption. 
 
3.3. Alternative Cholesky orderings 
Although many Structural VARs in the literature are identified through Cholesky decomposition 
(Marcellino 2006, Fatàs and Mihov 2001, Favero 2002), the estimations’ sensitivity to alternative 
orderings of the variables in the vector is no doubt a weak point of such an identification strategy. For 
that reason, in this subsection we test the robustness of our results to four alternative orderings in vector 
Zit . All impulse response functions are reported in Figure 5, where the baseline point estimates are 
reported in order to facilitate the comparison.  
 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
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 However, wage shocks cease to be statistically significant after one year, whereas non-wage shocks keep displaying their 
(quantitatively small) effects even 5 years after the shock. 
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First, we verify if a change in the ordering of expenditures and receipts matters (as in Marcellino 2006), 
covering the possibility that the government adjusts the level of its purchases according to its flow 
budget constraint within the year. This modification does not alter the results. Second, following some 
previous estimations of average price stickiness below four quarters (Christiano et al. 2005), we allow 
aggregate demand components to affect nominal prices within the year, ordering prices immediately 
after private investment and consumption. We also allow cyclically-adjusted tax revenue to be 
contemporaneously affected by private variables, in case the latter are hit by non-cyclical shocks. Both 
this changes do not alter the results. Finally, we relax the assumption of considering public spending as 
the most exogenous variable of the system in two additional ways. Allowing it to be 
contemporaneously affected by both cyclically adjusted net taxes and prices does not alter dramatically 
the responses, the only appreciable differences being higher responses of both prices and debt to public 
spending shocks. On the contrary, ordering private consumption and investment first in the Cholesky 
decomposition produces smaller estimated responses of both variables to shocks in public spending (as 
expected, since this ordering imposes a zero response on impact). Remember that, according to this 
alternative specification, we allow for government spending to be strongly pro-cyclical (see Lane, 
2003). In this case, while the response of private consumption remains positive as in our baseline 
specification, the positive reaction of private investment to public spending shocks disappears.  
 
4. Robustness checks 
In this section we perform a series of additional robustness checks to verify the results of our model’s 
preferred specification. We proceed along three dimensions: the first set of tests modifies the PVAR 
dimension; the second checks the robustness to variations of the countries included in the sample; 
finally, we re-estimate the baseline model for two different periods.10 
 
4.1. Different VAR dimensions  
Figure 6 shows the responses of both private consumption and private investment to shocks in public 
spending resulting from five different 5-variables VARs obtained by excluding (one at a time) public 
debt, net taxes, price level, private investment, private consumption. Figure 7 shows the responses of 
the same two variables of interest to shocks in public spending, this time resulting from three different 
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 Furthermore, we also ran other simple robustness checks (not shown here). For instance, we used the GDP deflator to 
deflate all the variables instead of using the own deflators. Results are never significantly affected. 
 10 
4-variables VARs obtained by excluding the following pairs of variables (one at a time): public debt 
and net taxes, public debt and price level, price level and net taxes. Only the point estimates are 
reported. Together with these alternative estimates, the baseline responses are reported in order to 
facilitate comparisons (see the thick solid lines). 
 
Insert Figures 6 & 7 
 
Both private consumption and investment are positively affected by public spending shocks, as in the 
preferred specification, but the latter does not react positively once prices are excluded from the model. 
More precisely, the response of private investment keeps the positive sign on impact in the three 
alternative specifications without prices, but in all cases after one year the response goes to zero and 
turns negative afterwards. This confirms the weaker estimated reaction of private investment with 
respect to private consumption, since a similar sensitivity is observed when the Cholesky ordering is 
altered so to prevent a contemporaneous reaction of private consumption and investment to public 
spending shocks. 
 
4.2. Sample variation 
We firstly estimate our PVAR excluding one country member at a time to see if there are single 
countries driving the results of the whole panel (as in Benetrix and Lane, 2009). Figure 8 shows the 
private consumption and investment responses to shocks in government spending, with the thick solid 
lines being the responses of the baseline model.  
 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
 
The figure demonstrates the robustness of the baseline responses to changes in the sample. Only in one 
case the exclusion of one country produces some slight quantitative differences, again in the response 
of private investment.11 Then, we re-estimate the same baseline model for a set of “core” EU countries: 
France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (as in Appendix C of Beetsma et al. 2006). 
Figure 9 shows the estimated responses of all the variables of the system to a public spending shock.  
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 Precisely, there is a smaller response of investment (and of consumption, even if the distance from the baseline estimate is 
lower) when Portugal is excluded. 
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Insert Figure 9 about here 
 
The more relevant difference lies in the prices response, which is smaller than the one estimated for the 
whole sample (the baseline point estimate lies mostly outside the 95% confidence interval estimated for 
the core countries). As for the private consumption response, it does not differ significantly from the 
baseline, even if the contemporaneous effect is smaller (+0.05%). Again, the response of private 
investment differ from the preferred estimate, though it never lies outside the 95% confidence interval 
estimated for the core countries. 
The importance of this particular pair of robustness tests is to be particularly emphasized, since it 
indicates the existence of a certain degree of sample homogeneity, necessary for the credibility of the 
panel analysis. 
 
4.3. Time variation and other checks 
As for the time dimension variation of the model, we re-estimate our PVAR concentrating on two 
alternative time spans. First, as some contributions provide evidence that both the variance of fiscal 
policy shocks and their effects on consumption have declined after 1980 (see e.g. Perotti 2004, Romer 
and Romer 2007), we estimate the model limiting the period of interest to 1980-2006. Figure 10 shows 
the impulse response functions of all variables to shocks in public spending.  
 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
 
The baseline responses appear once again to be qualitatively robust, although there is a significantly 
smaller response of prices. On the other hand, the 95% confidence intervals of the new responses of 
private consumption and investment comfortably contain the baseline point estimates, which are 
slightly larger, as expected 
Second, as the introduction of the Euro might have affected most countries in our sample, we restrict 
the sample period to the pre-EMU years (1970-1998). This modification might be viewed as a sort of 
control for potential structural breaks – caused by the monetary policy structural change – in the  way 
fiscal policy affects the economy in the EU countries. Figure 11 shows the impulse response functions 
of all variables to a shocks in government spending.  
 
Insert Figure 11 about here 
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The only noteworthy difference is the larger response of private investment with respect to the baseline 
estimate.  
We perform two final robustness checks. First, we re-estimate the preferred specification of the model 
with two lags instead of one (see Figure 12).  
 
Insert Figure 12 about here 
 
While the contemporaneous effects of a public spending shock do not differ substantially from the 
baseline estimates, the subsequent dynamics change for most of the variables. However, the baseline 
point estimate lies outside the newly estimated 95% confidence intervals only in the case of private 
consumption (starting from the second year after the shock). Finally, we estimate a different model 
where GDP is included in lieu of private consumption and investment (see Figure 13).  
 
Insert Figure 13 about here 
 
The response of GDP to a 1% public spending shock is 0.23% on impact, and reaches a cumulative 
response of 0.58% after three years. This is in line with the estimated responses of private consumption 
and investment, which are a substantial part of GDP. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The qualitative and quantitative response of private consumption to government expenditure shocks is 
a strong dividing line between Keynesian and RBC macroeconomic approaches. The empirical 
literature, although far from having reached a consensus, mostly find a positive relationship. However, 
the existing contributions have only marginally investigated the EU area, as they mainly looked at few 
countries (particularly the United States). In this paper we perform a PVAR analysis on 14 EU 
countries, using a balanced annual dataset from 1970 to 2006. Our results – robust to a wide range of 
robustness checks including sample and time variation as well as alternative Cholesky orderings- can 
be summarized as follows. First, shocks in government expenditure positively and persistently affect 
private consumption and investment (respectively, 0.24 and 0.41% on impact). Second, the 
disaggregation between wage and non-wage components reveals that  public salaries have a relatively 
stronger stimulating role., Note that this is not due to the different weight on GDP of the two 
 13 
components, which have comparable values in our sample. Third, we do not find a similar stimulating 
role for public investment (especially relative to the private counterpart). Finally, the private 
investment results are the one that shows the higher sensitivity to robustness checks, especially when 
we set to zero its contemporaneous response to public spending shocks and when we estimate more 
parsimonious PVARs excluding prices. 
While the first two results push towards a Keynesian world, the last two call for some caution in 
reading the stimulating role of public spending. Generally speaking, the effects of public expenditure 
deserve some additional attention: a further and more detailed disaggregation of government spending 
might be needed, as well as a parallel distinction - for instance - between purchases of durable and non-
durable consumption goods. As the need of finding the most appropriate “exit-strategy” from the 2009 
massive increase in public expenditure intensifies, these investigations regarding the usefulness of 
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Note: Confidence bands are the 5th and 95th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 500 replications. The thick 







Fig. 6: robustness check, private consumption and investment responses (shock in public spending  - point estimates only), 
5-variables VARs 
 
Note: the thick solid line is the baseline VAR point estimate; dotted lines are the point estimates of the impulse responses 




Fig. 7: robustness check, private consumption and investment responses (shock in public spending  - point estimates only), 
4-variables VARs 
 
Note: solid lines are the baseline VAR estimates; dotted lines are the point estimates of the impulse responses coming from 






Figure 8: robustness check, private consumption and investment responses (shock in public spending  - 
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Note: solid lines are the baseline VAR estimates; dotted lines are the point estimates of the impulse responses coming from 
the fourteen different VARs obtained by excluding one country of the sample at a time. The thick line is the point estimate 
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Note: Confidence bands are the 5th and 95th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 500 replications. The thick 
line is the point estimate of the baseline specification. 
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Note: Confidence bands are the 5th and 95th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 500 replications. The thick 
line is the point estimate of the baseline specification. 
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Note: Confidence bands are the 5th and 95th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 500 replications. The thick 
line is the point estimate of the baseline specification. 
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Note: Confidence bands are the 5th and 95th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 500 replications. The thick 
line is the point estimate of the baseline specification. 
 
 29 




















0 1 2 3 4 5 6





























0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Response of net taxes
Years after shock
Years after shockYears after shock
Years after shockYears after shock
 





Table 1. Responses to a 1% fiscal spending (gc) shock 
Response of  
 
gc t i c p b 
0 1.000*** 0.021 0.414*** 0.241*** -0.099*** 0.199 
1 0.246*** -0.277*** 0.262* 0.173*** 0.037 0.298 
2 0.110*** -0.089 0.152 0.094*** 0.105* 0.194 
3 0.058*** -0.016 0.068 0.047* 0.136** 0.131 
4 0.037*** 0.010 0.010 0.021 0.147** 0.110 
5 0.026** 0.016 -0.026 0.005 0.152** 0.110 
6 0.016** 0.016 -0.042 -0.005 0.147** 0.115 
***, **, *: significant at 1, 5 and 10% 
 
Table 2. Responses to a 1% government investment (gi) shock 
Response of  
 
gi t i c p b 
0 1.000*** -0.015 -0.042** 0.013** -0.005 0.047** 
1 0.103*** 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.011 
2 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 
3 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 









Table 3. Responses to a 1% government wage expenditure (gw) shock 
Response of  
 
gw t i c p b 
0 1.000*** 0.101 0.588*** 0.312*** -0.065* 0.211 
1 0.407*** -0.226** 0.166 0.111** 0.156 0.216 
2 0.196*** -0.141** -0.030 0.035 0.231 0.271 
3 0.106*** -0.045 -0.085 0.005 0.251 0.281 
4 0.065*** 0.005 -0.101 -0.010 0.251 0.266 
5 0.045** 0.025 -0.101 -0.015 0.246 0.241 
6 0.035** 0.035 -0.095 -0.015 0.231 0.221 




Table 4. Responses to a 1% government non-wage expenditure (gnw) shock 
Response of  
 
gnw t i c p b 
0 1.000*** -0.032 0.061 0.041* -0.053** 0.038 
1 -0.029 -0.088 0.129* 0.082*** -0.053** 0.099 
2 0.029*** -0.003 0.099** 0.041** -0.023 0.003 
3 0.009 0.003 0.058** 0.020** -0.009 -0.026 
4 0.006* 0.000 0.029* 0.012* 0.000 -0.026 
5 0.003 0.000 0.015 0.006* 0.003 -0.018 
6 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.003 -0.009 
***, **, *: significant at 1, 5 and 10% 
 
